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ABSTRACT
In the course of regulation of an economy, the situation often
arises where the regulator must treat similar though different goods as
though they were the same—for institutional, informational or trans-
action cost reasons. This may occur despite the efficiency gains from
regulatory product differentiation. This question is examined from a
theoretical perspective. Using a two good economy, output and net
social benefits are compared for the case of efficient, differentiated
regulation and the case of uniform, undifferentiated regulation of the
aggregate of the two goods. We show when aggregate production will be
greater than, equal to, or less than efficient production and we derive
conditions for each of these three possibilities. Further, we show
that when marginal costs and benefits become more steeply sloped, the
inefficiency associated with undifferentiated regulation increases.
The results are applied to an illustrative analysis of acid rain
control.

I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years a number of articles have been concerned with
"second-best" regulation, particularly the case where uncertainty on
the part of the regulator (the "center") precludes efficient regula-
2
tion. This paper is concerned with second-best regulation, not in an
environment of uncertainty, but in the situation where the regulator
must regulate similar though different goods as though they were the
same. For political, institutional, informational or transaction cost
reasons, it may be desirable (or necessary) to regulate aggregates of
goods rather than totally differentiate all goods as would be dictated
by simple efficiency considerations. It may be much more costly to set
and adjust a regulation for each of a set of similar goods than to regu-
late the goods as if they were the same. This situation is extremely
common in regulation as can be seen from considering several examples.
In environmental regulation it may be efficient to regulate each
source of pollution differently, according to its contribution to envi-
ronmental damage, but more politically tractable to apply the same
regulation to all firms. This particular point has been a major source
of controversy in environmental regulation (see Tietenberg, 1978),
including the current debate over acid-rain control in the U.S. In
reality, a pollution source's location determines how much of its
emissions cause damage. Sources far from sensitive areas are less of
a problem than sources nearby. The political debate has concerned
whether a source's emissions should be limited according to its contri-
bution to an environmental problem or according to a more "equitable"
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formula involving similar treatment for all sources. In the first
case, marginal pollution control costs after regulation will depend on
a source's marginal environmental damage. In the later case, the regu-
lated marginal pollution control cost will be the same for all sources,
based on average marginal damage. The proposal to use a single emis-
sion fee (Pigouvian tax) for all polluters can be contrasted to the
efficient application of a different emission fee to different pollu-
ters, based on their contribution to damage. Of course, if a uniform
regulatory approach is pursued because of the informational costs asso-
ciated with determining different fees for each polluter, the uniform
regulation may be efficient in an overall sense.
As a second example of uniform vs. differentiated regulation con-
sider the case of a protective tariff. Leaving aside the issue of
whether protection is desirable or efficient, such tariffs may be
levied against groups of products or may be levied on specific products
based on the marginal threat to domestic firms. Usually an implicit
tradeoff is made between the cost of setting and otherwise implementing
a set of tariffs on individual goods and the efficiency loss associated
with treating similar goods identically. For instance, specific types
of automobiles may represent the greatest threat to domestic auto pro-
ducers but a uniform tariff may be levied against all imported automo-
biles. Goods may appear similar but in fact are not close substitutes
in terms of the goals of regulation.
As a final example, consider the case of oil imports into the U.S.
A primary reason that has been put forward for placing a tariff on
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imported oil is that it would correct an externality associated with
the national risk, of disruption of imports from overseas suppliers,
particularly in the Middle East. Yet it has not been suggested
(although it apparently has been considered) that differential tariffs
be levied on oil coming from different countries— that tariffs be based
on the stability of supply from particular countries. Although such a
discriminatory tariff might be more efficient, it would be difficult to
set, politically sensitive to implement and, perhaps most important,
difficult to enforce due to the ease with which third-party nations
could engage in arbitrage, "laundering" the oil.
Although this list of examples could go on, the point is that it
may be desirable to sacrifice some economic efficiency (narrowly defined)
by regulating dissimilar products as if they were the same. Such "uni-
form" or "undifferentiated" regulation is the subject of this paper.
The regulatory center has complete knowledge of production costs,
demand and other benefits or disbenefits of production and consumption.
The center seeks to assure that the most efficient amounts are produced
and consumed, given the regulatory instruments it has available.
Although regulation may take many forms, we will focus on price and
quantity instruments. A tax or subsidy may be applied differentially
to each good or uniformly over classes of goods. Or, regulation may
take the form of output quotas where output of specific goods is
controlled or aggregate output of classes of goods is controlled.
In this paper we address two specific questions. How might such
uniform regulation behave? Would output be greater or less under such
regulation than output under differentiated regulation? One might think
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that output would necessarily be less but this need not be the case. A
second, and perhaps more important question concerns the welfare loss
associated with uniform regulation. Under what conditions will that
loss be modest and under what conditions will the loss be greatest?
Clearly this question is of the utmost importance in deciding whether
the gains associated with regulatory uniformity offset the efficiency
losses.
This paper is divided into three parts. In the next two sections
we present a simple model of regulation and develop the concept of
uniform or undifferentiated regulation. In the subsequent section we
discuss the welfare losses associated with uniform control and determine
the ways in which the basic conditions of the market enhance or diminish
the welfare loss. In the last section of the paper, as an illustra-
tion, we apply our results to the issue of acid rain regulation addressed
above, and derive some qualified conclusions about the appropriateness
of uniform regulation in this case. We end with conclusions.
II. THE MODEL
We wish to set up a stylized model where two goods are produced at
some cost and when they are consumed produce some social benefit. We
assume that no market exists for these goods and thus it is necessary
to centrally determine the amount of these goods that are supplied and
consumed. It is straightforward to interpret the analysis in terms of
traded goods with regulations set to correct externalities. Perfect
information is assumed on the part of everyone. For reasons that are
exogenous to the analysis, the center can only control the aggregate
output of the goods. However, we will contrast this second-best
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situation to the first-best case where the center can regulate output
of the two goods separately. We will ignore informational or trans-
action costs associated with differentiated regulation. We are
approaching this problem in terms of goods. This is to follow conven-
tion. Our results can be readily interpreted in terras of allocating
bads as would be the case with regulating pollutants.
Let there be two firms, indexed 1 and 2, producing goods in the
amounts q.. and q„. These goods will be considered distinct although
the distinction is most important on the demand side. It may be that
production costs are identical for the two goods. We will assume that
the production process can be captured in a well defined cost function
for each firm, C (q-,) and C (q 9 ). We will further assume costs are
3
twice dif ferentiable and strictly convex over the non-negative orthant.
Benefits are represented by a single function B(q
,
q„). While to-
tal costs can reasonably be assumed to be additive this is less likely
to be the case for benefits. In fact as long as there is any substitu-
tability (or complimentarity) between q.. and q ? , benefits will not be
additively separable. For convenience, benefits will be denominated in
monetary units. Benefits will be assumed to be twice dif ferentiable
and concave over the non-negative orthant. Differentiability, of
course, requires that all first and second derivatives are finite which
precludes perfectly inelastic functions.
A. The Center's Regulatory Problems
Ideally, the center wishes to dictate output levels q and q which
maximize net benefits:
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Typically, this is a straightforward problem. A centrally optimal
A A
allocation will occur at (q , q.) where
3B(q q ) 3C
k
(q )
3qk
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assuming both firms produce. But the complicating factor here is that
the center cannot directly distinguish q from q„ at least insofar as
controlling production levels is concerned. The center uses a single
instrument to control both producers, unable to offer different signals
to the two producers. Although there are a host of instruments availa-
ble for controlling the two producers, consider price incentives and
quantity controls. In the former, a single price is offered producers
for their output. Both producers face the same price. In the case of
quantity controls, tradeable production quotas can be issued. Rights
to produce will bear a negative equilibrium price since producing
nothing is cheapest of all. These two instruments of course have the
same effect in a world of certainty. Without loss of generality, we
will assume that the center controls aggregate output,
Q = q 1 + q 2
(3)
through the issuance of tradeable production quotas. If q.(Q) defines
the reaction of the ith producer to an aggregate output quota, Q, then
the center's second-best regulatory problem is
-7-
max w(
qi (Q), q2 (Q))
= B^CQ), q2 (Q)) - C
1
(q 1 (Q))
- C
2
(q 2 (Q)) (4)
q.(Q) > 0, i - 1, 2
The center still must strive to maximize net benefits, but now using
only the one dimensional parameter Q instead of q.. and q_.
B. The Firms Production Decisions
We now turn to the question of how the two firms will respond to a
uniform production quota; i.e., we wish to characterize q.(Q) and q„(Q).
Assume the two firms are granted a lump-sum subsidy sufficient to assure
that they do not go out of business. Thus the two firms will buy and
sell rights to produce so that any dictated aggregate output level will
be achieved at least cost. Total costs can be minimized for a given
level of total output (Q) by finding a saddle-point of
Z C
k
(q k
) + X(
q;L
+ q 2
- Q) (5)
k
for which first order conditions (assuming both firms produce) are
fli7"ifr' v q j > ° (6)
i 3
and q + q^, = Q. The Lagrange multiplier on equation (5) is of course
1 <i
the market price on rights to produce and will be negative (for a good)
and equal in magnitude to marginal production costs.
We seek firm reaction functions giving output levels as a function
of the aggregate permit issuance, Q. In order to derive such reaction
functions analytically, we will now work in terms of second-order approx-
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imations to the cost and benefit functions. We expand costs and benefits
in a Taylor expansion about the efficient output levels (q, , q 9 ):
° 1(V - eo + V<i - V +HiS - <V 2 (7a)
C
2
(q
2
) - Cq + C
2
(q
2
- q 2
) +yC22 (q 2 - q^)
2
(7b)
B(q
r q 2 )
- B
Q
+ B^^ - q\) + B^q., - q^) + j- {^^ " q\) 2
+ B
22 (q 2
- q 2
) + 2B
12 (q 1
- q\>(q2 - q^)} (7c)
where the subscripted C's and B's are constants and refer to various
1 2first and second derivatives of the three functions (C , C , B) evaluated
at (q , q_) . The use of such second-order approximations is fairly cora-
4
mon in the literature.
We now turn to deriving expressions for output of each firm as a
function of the aggregate permit issuance, Q. Note first that applying
the costs and benefits approximation (equation 7) to the first-order
conditions for efficient regulation (equation 2) yields the identities
C, » B, for k = 1, 2 (8a)
k k
and thus
(C
1
- C
2
) - (B
1
- B
2
). (8b)
These identities will be used later. We can now rewrite the first-order
conditions for optimal firm response to a quota (equation 6) (assuming
both producers are in the market), using the second-order approxima-
tions of costs in equation (7):
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£
1
+ a
il (q l " V " 62 + a22 (q 2 " qV' (9)
This equation merely states that under a uniform instrument, marginal
costs for the two producers are equal. Using the fact that q + q~ = Q,
this can be solved for output (q,
,
q~) in response to any permit
issuance Q:
(C
2
" C ) + C (Q-Q)
q,(Q) * q, + = S—= (10a)
1 1 r + rL
ll °22
(C - C ) + C (Q-Q)
q,(Q) = q 9 +——ir* r-^ (10b)
L
ll
L
22
where Q = q.. + q„. These are producer reaction functions, giving output
for each producer in response to any permit issuance Q.
III. OUTPUT WITH AN OPTIMAL UNIFORM INSTRUMENT
We are now in a position to determine the optimal permit issuance,
Q*. At Q*, net benefits will be maximized given that only aggregate
output can be controlled. Thus net benefits will be lower (or at least
no higher) than net benefits at (q,, q 9 )« As before (equation 4), let
W(Q) be an expression for net benefits from any permit issuance Q from
which output (q,> q 9 ) results. Net benefits can be approximated using
the second-order approximations of equations (7):
W(Q) - B(q lf q 2 )
- C
1
^) - C 2 (q 2 )
- Bj + B
1
(q
1
- q
x
) + B
2
(q
2
- ^) +y I^Cqj " q\) 2
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22 (q 2
- q 2
) + 2B 12 ( qi
- q
1
>(q
2
" q
2
)
}
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2
- q 2
) -yC22 (q 2 - q 2 ) . (11)
The first order condition for a welfare maximum is that dW/dQ =
(provided Q > at an optimum). Viewing q and q as functions of Q,
equation (11) can be differentiated with respect to Q (assuming both
producers are in the market), with dq,/dQ coming from the reaction
functions q,(Q) and q ? (Q) (equation 10):
^ - -{[Cn (l-0 2 ) + C22 (1-0 1 )](Q-Q) - (C1 - C 2 )(0 2 - 3 1 )}CnC22
* (Sl + ^22
)2 (12)
B
ll
B
12 .
B
22
B
12
where t3, = -— + -—, 6 = —— + -5— •
C
ll
U
22 ^22 °11
To find the optimal uniform instrument Q* , we set dW/dQ = and solve
the equation for Q*
:
(C - C 9 )(3 ? - 6,)
(Q* - Q) =—7 = ~ ~ • (13)
C
ll
(1" 6
2
) + C22 (1
" 3
1
)
It turns out that the denominator of the right-hand-side of equation
(13) is always positive. To see this we evaluate the second derivative
of W with respect to Q (by differentiating W'(Q)—equation 12). Since
W is strictly concave in Q, its second derivative at Q* is negative:
A (Cll (1-¥ +C 22 (1- B 1 )1C 11C 22 ,.
_ a _ _ < . (14)
dQ ( C 1X
+ c
22 )
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Since C is strictly convex, C > 0. Thus equation (14) implies that
the denominator of equation (13) is positive. The result embodied in
equation (13) is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 : To a second-order approximation in costs and benefits,
an optimal uniform instrument, Q*, will result in greater or lesser
A
output than is efficient (Q) according to the following:
A A A A
t>
— R R — R
sign(Q* - Q) = sign{(C 9 - C. ) [-^ — - -^ —] } (15a)Zip p
°11 °22
A A A A
= sign{(B_ - B.)[ x x ]}Q. (15b)zip pL
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In the above proposition, the second expression is obtained using
equation (8b). In qualitative terras, the proposition states that two
factors determine the level of aggregate output under uniform regula-
tion: the difference in marginal costs for the two producers at the
efficient level of output (C - C„) and the difference in the relative
slopes of benefits and costs for the two products at the efficient
level of output (the bracketed terras). The proposition can perhaps be
better understood by simplifying it enough to examine it graphically.
A
Suppose cross-effects in benefits are zero (B = 0) and the two pro-12ducers share the same underlying cost functions C (q) = C (q) but C
need not equal C ).
This situation is shown in Figure 1 where without loss of generality
we have assumed B < B . Efficient production calls for output of q11 zz 1
and q_, where each of the two marginal benefit functions cross the mar-
ginal cost curve (see the first-order conditions for a first-best regu-
lation—equation 2). Consider now what happens with uniform regulation.
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Because both firms have the same marginal cost function, they will both
produce at the same level, splitting equally the total number of permits
to produce, Q. If the total allocated output is Q then they will each
produce Q/2 as shown in the Figure. The welfare loss associated with
uniform regulation Q is the area of triangles A and B. The question is:
can welfare be increased by raising or lowering (from Q) total allowed
A A A A A
output? The proposition states that Q* < Q since B < B~ and B.. < B„«.
As output is reduced from Q, the area of triangle A in Figure 1 in-
creases and the area of triangle B decreases. The direction of change
of total welfare depends on whether or not the area of triangle A in-
creases faster than the area of triangle B decreases. Simple geometry
tells us that the triangle associated with the steeper marginal benefit
A A
function changes most rapidly. Thus the difference between B.. . and B»
9
tells us which triangle changes in area most rapidly with a change in Q.
a A
The difference between B and B~ tells us whether that triangle is the
a a
top one or the bottom one in the Figure and thus whether Q* > Q or Q* < Q<
a
Thus, returning to the proposition, we see that the sign of (Q* - Q)
really depends only on the difference between the ratio of the slopes of
the marginal benefit and cost functions for the two producers with the
A A
term (B - B„ ) only serving to distinguish the two producers in terras
of their relative contribution to benefits.
Two interesting things can be noticed from the proposition. One
obvious point is that if marginal costs (or equivalently, marginal
benefits) from efficient output are the same for the two products, then
Q* = 0. Of course, in this case there is no efficiency loss from uni-
form control. Perhaps more interesting is the fact that if marginal
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benefits are constant (but possibly different) for the two goods,
then Q* = Q (since B =0):
Corollary 1 : To a second-order approximation in costs and benefits,
with constant but possibly different marginal benefits for the two
goods, then the aggregate output from an efficient uniform instrument
will be the same as an efficient aggregate level of output.
This corollary states that with linear benefits, "coincidentally"
the same level of aggregate output will result from a uniform instrument
as from an efficient, product-differentiated instrument. However, net
benefits will not necessarily be at the same level. The corollary does
not suggest that for linear benefits, uniform instruments result in effi-
cient control.
The corollary can be understood in the context of the discussion of
the proposition. Figure 2 is similar to Figure 1 except that marginal
benefits are constant. A crucial part of the graphical proof of the
proposition was that the different slopes of the two marginal benefit
functions led to unequal rates of change of the two triangular welfare
loss regions as Q was changed. However in this case, it is easy to see
from Figure 2 that the welfare loss is minimized at Q/2 for each pro-
ducer. Thus while uniform regulation still results in a welfare loss,
it is minimized at Q* = Q*
Although welfare may be reduced with uniform regulation even though
aggregate output remains unchanged it is interesting to note that pro-
ducer costs will generally be lower under uniform regulation. Recall
that the firms' response to a quota was to produce the aggregate amount
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of the quota at least-cost (equation 5). Thus the total cost of pro-
ducing (q , q ) can be no less than the cost of producing Q* = q + q
under a uniform regulation:
Corollary 2 : To a second-order approximation in costs and benefits with
constant but possibly different marginal benefits for the two goods,
then total production costs from an efficient uniform instrument will
be less than or equal to total production costs with efficient output.
Thus it is the benefits side which bears all inefficiencies of uni-
form regulation as well as all cost savings accruing to producers. Pro-
ducers as a whole stand to benefit from uniform regulation.
Up to now, we have been focusing on aggregate output and costs under
uniform regulation. The natural next question is how is firm output
affected by uniform regulation? One might expect that the firm with
higher marginal costs would produce less than the firm with lower mar-
ginal costs. But it turns out we can say something even stronger.
Under uniform regulation, if the goods are substitutes, the firm with
lower marginal costs will be producing more than its efficient level of
output while its rival will produce less than its efficient output.
This is the case whether Q* is small or large relative to Q. Formally,
we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 : To a second order approximation in costs and benefits,
with two firms producing substitutes, then firm output under uniform
controls is related to efficient firm output according to the
following:
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sign(q* - q ) = sign(C_ - C ) [and thus = sign (B„ - B )] (16a)
sign(q* - q ) = -sign(q* - q 2 ) (16b)
Proof: Consider the value of (q* - q ). Substitute the value of Q* fr
equation (13) into equation (10a) to obtain:
om
(C
2
" C
l
) + C22
(C
1
" C
2
)(3
2
"
1
}
c„(i-8,) + c^ci-e.)
. ii i n i
q* - q, a 7 ~
L
ll
L
22
d-e9 )
= (C, - C) {- —^ } (17)
C
11
(1_B
2
) + C22
(1" 6
1
)
Since the denominator of the expression in braces was argued to be posi-
tive (from equation 14), and since C > (from strict convexity), the
expression in braces is positive if 8 < 0. From the concavity of B,
we know B
?
< 0. By the assumption of substitutability of good one and
two, B-„ < 0. Thus, from equation (12), we know that B_ < 0. From
^ A, A At
equation (8b), we know C - C„ a B - B . Equation (16b) is obvious
1 2. X £•
since q 1 + q_ = Q.
Consider the intuition embodied in Proposition 2. One would expect an
optimal uniform regulation to over-regulate one firm and under-regulate
the other. If both firms were under-regulated then an increase in Q*
would make both firms better regulated and thus would be a more effi-
cient output level. In Figure 1, Q*/2 would have to be between q and
q_. If Q*/2 were less than q (for instance) then the areas of both
triangles (the welfare loss) would be reduced by increasing Q*. If Q*/2
At At
is between q 1 and q ? then obviously one firm is producing more than is
efficient and the other firm is producing less than is efficient.
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One question that might arise concerning the previous Propositions
and Corollaries is the not unlikely situation of perfectly inelastic
benefits or perfectly elastic costs, a situation precluded by assump-
tion. For instance, in such cases, the bracketed expression in
equation (15) goes to ± °°.
Suppose marginal costs are constant (perfectly elastic). If one
producer has lower marginal costs after the quota has been allocated
and traded, he alone will be producing; the lower cost producer can bid
away all the production rights from the other producer. Thus, if pro-
ducer one is the lower-cost producer, q* = Q* and q* = 0. Q* would be
1 i.
set at the point where marginal costs of production for good one equal
the marginal benefits. If the goods are substitutes, as q_ drops from
q to zero, 3B/3q will rise leading to an increase in q (i.e., q* > q.. )
.
If the goods are complements, the opposite happens (q* < q ) . Finally,
it is clear that if benefits are additively separable, then q* = q 1 :
Proposition 3 : Assume a second-order approximation in costs and benefits,
A
except that marginal costs are constant and unequal (C, = 0). Without
loss of generality, assume C < C . Then the optimal uniform instru-
ment (0*) is given by
B. B. 1
Q* - Q -
U
'
U V (18)B
ll
2
and (q*, q*) = (Q*, 0).
Proof: Clearly, the producer with the lower marginal cost will be the
only one producing; thus q* = 0. By setting q to zero and differen-
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tiating equation (11) with respect to q and setting the result to zero,
one obtains equation (18) above.
The case of perfectly inelastic marginal benefits is somewhat more
interesting. Returning to our expression for an optimal uniform regu-
lation (equation 13— from which equation 15 is derived), note that as
B * - <», the numerator and denominator of the right-hand-side of equa-
tion (13) become infinite. Thus to evaluate (Q* - Q) one must apply
l'Hopital's rule in taking the limit of the right-hand-side of the equa-
tion as B goes to negative infinity. In doing so, we obtain the fol-
lowing proposition:
Proposition 4 : To a second-order approximation in costs and benefits with
A, A
inelastic marginal benefits with respect to one good (B or B +• - «*),
finite cross effects (|B «| < °°) and assuming costs are not perfectly
elastic (C * 0), an optimal uniform instrument, Q* , will result in
K. K.
greater or lesser output than is efficient (Q) according to the following
(c
1
- c
2
)
B, , -
C 11
°22
Q* - Q - (19)
(C
2
- V
£
11
B + - °°D
22
Note that this proposition indicates not only the sign of Q* - Q
but the magnitude. In essence, as one of the marginal benefit curves
becomes perfectly inelastic, it becomes important to make no errors in
regulating the product with inelastic benefits. Suppose in Figure 1,
-18-
one of the marginal benefit curves, say 3B/8q„, is rotated to the ver-
tical. It then becomes optimal to move Q*/2 closer to the efficient
output level for that good, q„. Large efficiency losses are associated
with either under- or over-producing the good with inelastic marginal
benefits. Thus aggregate uniform output may be smaller or larger than
efficient output depending on which good has inelastic marginal bene-
fits. For the cases of both goods having inelastic marginal benefits,
the problem becomes more indeterminate, although if one precludes
marginal benefits from being negative, output under uniform regulation
will be less than under efficient control because welfare losses from
under-controlling a source will be limited (assuming marginal benefits
cannot go negative) while losses from over-control will not be limited.
IV. COMPARATIVE STATICS OF WELFARE LOSS
In the last section we examined output under aggregate output regu-
lation We derived conditions where optimal aggregate output could be
less than, equal to, or greater than aggregate efficient output. How-
ever, in all cases, net benefits were of course less than or equal to
the net benefits associated with efficient output levels. The question
remains as to how great the welfare loss is under uniform regulation.
Afterall, uniform regulation will only be pursued if the welfare loss
associated with such regulation is acceptable.
In this section we define the welfare loss associated with aggre-
gate output regulation and, through comparative statics, investigate
the effect of the slope of the marginal cost and benefit functions on
this loss of net benefits. We show that it is the slope of the mar-
ginal benefit and cost functions which determine the extent of welfare
-19-
loss; the steeper these two functions, the greater the welfare loss.
This result is embodied in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 : To a second-order approximation in costs and benefits,
the steeper the marginal cost functions (greater C or C„ 9 ) or the
steeper the marginal benefit functions (greater |B | or |B |), the
larger the welfare loss associated with uniform output regulation rela-
tive to welfare under efficient production.
Proof: Define the welfare loss (A) as the difference between net bene-
fits from efficient production (W„) and net benefits from uniform
E
aggregate output regulation (W )
:
A = W_ - W
TT
(20)
E U
Since a change in either C.
.
or B.. will not change efficient levelsn n
of output, dW /dC.. = dW^/dB.. = 0. Thus we need only consider changes
E li E li
in Wu :
A A dWIT ^A dWTTdA
_
U
t
dA
_ _
U f0 . .
dC. dC. dB.. dB..n n n n
Net benefits from uniform control are defined by equations 10, 11, and
13. Rather than make the complex substitution of Q* into equation 11
to obtain W(Q*), consider W as a function of Q* , C. and B... Thusli li
dA dWU 3WU 3Q
3W
U
dC.
.n dC. .n
3Q 3C.
.n 3C. .n
dA
dw
u
3W
u 3Q
3W
U
dB.
.
li
dB.
.
li
3Q 3B.
.
li
3B.
.
li
(22a)
(22b)
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But Q* is set so that 3W /3Q = (equation 12). Thus we only need to
partially differentiate the net benefits function (equation 11) with
respect to C. . and B... In doing this we find 3W/3C.. < and
1 1 n U n
3W/3B.. > which implies that dA/dC. . > and dA/dB.
.
< 0. Since
U n n n
B. . < 0, the proposition is proved,n
This result indicates that the least error (in a welfare sense)
from adopting uniform instruments is associated with linear costs and
benefits and the most error is associated with sharply curved costs and
benefits (i.e., steep marginal costs and benefits). This behavior is
as would be expected. With benefits and costs changing rapidly in the
vicinity of efficient output, errors associated with uniform regulation
become more serious, resulting in significant changes in costs and bene-
fits from just moderate changes in output for each product.
This proposition can also be interpreted graphically. Figure 3
shows the welfare loss associated with uniform regulation, assuming
both producers share the same marginal cost function and benefits are
additively separable (B 1<? = 0). Shown is the effect of an increase in
the slope of 3B/3q 9 . When the curve becomes steeper, Q* increases,
moving to a new point of minimum welfare loss. In the process the
total welfare loss increases.
A caution is in order however. This proposition is a comparative
statics result on the effect of changes in slopes of marginal benefit
and cost functions. All other parameters, specifically those affecting
efficient output levels (such as C., B., and q.), are left unchanged.
This point can be appreciated by referring to Figure 2. The proposi-
tion would suggest that if the marginal cost function were rotated
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clockwise, the welfare loss would decrease; but inspection of the
Figure indicates that the opposite would be true. However, any rotation
of either marginal cost curve about efficient output levels necessarily
separates the two marginal cost curves. There is no way for both firms
to continue to share the same marginal cost function as C or C is
increased without changing q or q_. Thus, one must be careful in
applying the proposition.
V. AN APPLICATION
At this point, it is illustrative to return to one of the policy
questions raised in the introduction— the question of acid rain
control. Acid rain is a problem in many areas but most conspicuously
in Europe and North America. Damage from acid rain, in those two
regions, is concentrated, respectively, in Scandinavia and eastern
North America, particularly in the vicinity of the Canada-U.S. border.
Sources of acid rain are generally thought to be power plants and are
spread over a wide geographic area—as far away as Britain in the case
of Europe; or Illinois in the case of North America. The more distant
a source is from environmentally sensitive areas, the less its contri-
bution to damage. A key question is the degree of inefficiency in an
approach treating all sources the same (as in proposed U.S. legisla-
tion) despite the fact that they contribute differently to pollution
damage (due to differences in distances between pollution sources and
regions sensitive to acid rain)?
Let a variety of sources (indexed bv i) produce pollution (e.)
I
which is transported and cleansed by the atmosphere resulting in
environmental damage at some distant locale. The relationship between
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emissions (e.) and pollution levels (X) at the distant locale is
linear: X = £ a.e., where a. is a "transfer coefficient" relating
7
emissions at i to pollution levels at the distant locale. Since most
sources are coal-burning power plants, it seems reasonable to assume
that the marginal cost functions for controlling emissions are similar
for each source. Further, suppose acid rain damage is linearly related
to pollution concentrations at the distant locale (this may or may not
be true). If this is the case, the marginal damage function (in terms
of emissions) for the various sources will be horizontal and offset
according to the a.'s.
Let us now address this regulatory question using the tools and
conventions of this paper. In keeping with the rest of the paper, let
us speak in terms of air quality (a good) rather than air pollution (a
bad). Instead of emissions at i we will speak of local air quality at
i. Sources produce local air quality which in turn is transported (to
different degrees) by the atmosphere resulting in distant air quality
at a locale sensitive to acid rain. The marginal cost of producing
local air quality is roughly the same for all sources and is upward
sloping. As was argued above, marginal benefits of local air quality
will be assumed to be roughly constant but displaced with respect to
one another (due to differences in atmospheric transport) with lower
marginal benefits for more distant sources.
Consequently, we have a situation similar to that depicted in
Figure 2. From Corollary 1, aggregate emissions of pollutants will be
the same whether or not emissions are regulated efficiently or uni-
formly. Further, industry as a whole may have to pay less for environ-
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mental control under uniform regulation. The welfare loss from uniform
regulation depends on the slope of marginal costs. If in fact marginal
costs of pollution control are relatively steeply sloped, all sources
share the same cost function and external costs associated with effi-
cient control are high, then uniform regulation may be best. This
result can be contrasted to other environmental regulatory situations
where there may be a threshold effect with damages; i.e., a kinked
damage function. In such cases marginal benefits will be very steep
near the kink and thus uniform controls may be highly inefficient (see
Kolstad, 1982).
The same approach can be used to examine the other policy questions
mentioned in the introduction. The utility of the analysis presented
in this paper is that we have shown how the conditions of the market
affect the relative inefficiency of aggregate output regulation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has addressed the common situation where the center must,
for some reason, sacrifice efficiency and regulate the output of similar
though different goods as though they were the same. In the paper we
have examined two basic issues associated with such uniformity of regu-
lation: how might these regulations perform and what are the efficiency
implications of uniformity?
The first issue we treated was the characterization of uniform
regulation. What is an optimal uniform regulation? What might firm
and industry output be under such regulation? How do the basic condi-
tions of the market influence the answers to these questions? Using a
second-order approximation to costs and benefits, we derived the exact
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level of a uniform regulation and showed that aggregate output might be
greater than, equal to or less than efficient output. In the situation
where marginal costs are constant, then aggregate output is the same
under uniform regulation as under efficient regulation. Further, of
two firms, the firm whose product results in the greater marginal bene-
fit will produce more under uniform regulation than under efficient
regulation.
The second issue we addressed concerned the welfare losses asso-
ciated with undifferentiated regulation. Unquestionably, uniform regu-
lation is less efficient than differentiated regulation (except in a
few cases, where they are both equally efficient). The question is,
when is the efficiency loss greatest and when is it smallest? How do
the basic conditions of the market effect the efficiency loss? We
showed that the least inefficiency is associated with perfectly elastic
marginal cost and benefit functions and that inefficiency increases as
these functions become more steeply sloped.
In applying this result to the acid rain issue, it appeared that if
the marginal pollution control costs and pollution damage are relatively
shallowly sloped, as they may be, then uniform regulation may not be
too inefficient, at least relative to situations with more steeply
sloped curves.
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Footnotes
Department of Economics and Institute for Environmental Studies,
University of Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801. Comments from Jim Sweeney,
Larry DeBrock, Gary Johnson and Jan Brueckner have been appreciated.
2
Weitzman (1974) focuses on the situation where the center must
make allocation decision in an uncertain environment and may not revise
those decisions after uncertainty is resolved.
3
Strict convexity is slightly stronger than necessary, eliminating
the case of constant marginal costs. The strictness will be relaxed in
parts of the paper although it is always necessary that the difference
between benefits and costs be strictly concave.
Samuelson (1970) justifies the use of second-order approximations
in portfolio analysis. Weitzman (1974) uses such an approximation in a
context very similar to this paper to derive results on the relative
desirability of price and quantity instruments for central management
of output. His application illustrates a problem associated with the
use of such an approximation. He is able to derive very powerful
results using a second-order approximation—results that would probably
not otherwise be obtainable; yet in subsequent comments, Laffont (1977)
and Malcomson (1978) point out situations where the second-order
approximation breaks down, invalidating his results. In any event, we
rationalize our use of second-order approximations by noting they are
necessary to achieve the specific results reported here. Rather than
indicate how accurate our approximation might be, we urge that our
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results be interpreted with care, mindful that they are only approxi-
mate results. An approximation such as ours is of course usually quite
good in the vicinity of the point of expansion (q , q 9 ).
By assumption C and C-- are nonzero (strict convexity) and the
second derivatives are finite (differentiability).
(.
Since B(q
,
q„) is concave and each C (q.) is strictly convex,
1 2
B(q
,
q_) - C (q,) ~ C (q„) is strictly concave. Obviously, over the
subset of the non-negative orthant where q + q„ = Q, this function is
also strictly concave and thus so is W(Q).
This relationship between emissions and average concentrations is
widely recognized to be approximately linear (Golumb, 1983).
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Figure 1: Welfare Loss with Uniform Instrument
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Figure 2: Welfare Loss, Linear Benefits
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Figure 3: Effect of Increasing the Slope
of the Marginal Benefit Function
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